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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S UNBOUNDED 
CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY IN PATENT 
LAW
Matthew Kaiser*
This Note examines the doctrine of inherency in patent law, which 
relates to the Patent Act’s novelty requirement, and—theoretically—
seeks to ensure that inventions that are already within the public 
domain are not wrenched away from the public through a later patent 
grant. Unfortunately, a lack of recent Supreme Court guidance and a 
conflict within the Federal Circuit concerning what is necessary to 
prove inherency have led to a confusing and unpredictable body of 
inherency law. This Note begins by outlining the increased concern for 
uniformity and predictability in patent law; it then traces the early 
treatment of inherent anticipation by the Supreme Court, as well as the 
Federal Circuit and its predecessor court. Next, it argues that the 
Federal Circuit’s more recent inherency jurisprudence has expanded 
the scope of inherency, particularly with respect to patents covering 
pharmaceuticals, introducing dangerous and costly unpredictability 
into the patent system. Finally, it proposes a common-sense solution 
aimed at abrogating the current boundless conception of inherency in 
order to allow patent law and inherency to perform their central 
functions: to provide predictability and ensure the important patent 
policy of rewarding new inventions that are not already within the 
public domain. 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Philosophy, DePaul 
University, May 2011. I would like to thank the current editors and staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their efforts towards publishing this Note. A special thanks to Professor 
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their endless love and support.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of uniform application of the law can hardly be 
contested in any context. Patent law is no exception. In fact, 
legislative history demonstrates a heightened concern for consistent, 
predictable application of the law in the context of patents.1
Uniformity creates predictability, and predictability in turn provides 
inventors with the ability to prudently invest in research and 
development.2 However, the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions 
concerning the doctrine of inherent anticipation represent a troubling 
expansion of the doctrine that injects new and costly uncertainty into 
the patent system.3
Inherent anticipation is an admittedly difficult concept, even for 
the most skilled patent attorneys.4 It relates to the statutory 
requirement that an invention be novel—that is, something 
undisclosed to the public.5 When an invention or a written 
description of an invention predates the invention on which a patent 
application is filed, the prior invention or disclosure is deemed “prior 
art.”6 If a prior art reference published more than one year before the 
 1. Federal patent law and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit were created to 
promote fair, uniform, and predictable application of patent law. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (Part 
I), 79 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 65 (1997) (discussing the constitutional framers’ 
decision to create federal patent law in light of the inevitable conflict that would be created by 
allowing different patent laws to the promulgated by the states; Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1985) (merging the Court of Claims and Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals to form the Federal Circuit). See also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312 at  
20–22 (1981) (arguing in favor of creating the Federal Circuit in order to combat the effects of 
“pro-patent” and “anti-patent” jurisdictions); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial 
Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 685 (1993) (asserting Congress created 
the Federal Circuit to allow for “consistent application of the law . . . [which] would have a direct 
and salutary effect on industrial innovation, and thereby on the nation’s technological strength 
and international competitiveness”).  
 2. See Newman supra note 1, at 685.  
 3. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 4. Id. at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Inherency is a very tricky concept in patent law.”). 
 5. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“A patent claim is not valid if ‘the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in 
this . . . country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States.’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000))). 
 6. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–78 (majority opinion) (discussing prior art 
references and their interaction with the underlying patent claims at issue). 
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effective filing date of a patent application contains all of the same 
claims as the later patent application, the prior art is said to 
“anticipate” the claims.7 Anticipation negates novelty, and therefore 
no patent can issue on anticipated subject matter.8
For example, if a professor of pharmacology publishes a 2010 
dissertation disclosing that administration of captopril, an 
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor, to patients at risk for stroke 
effectively reduces the patient’s risk of stroke, that dissertation is 
deemed prior art with respect to any subsequent patent applications 
pertaining to the administration of captopril to stroke-prone patients. 
Accordingly, if an inventor files a patent application in 2012 
claiming administration of captopril to stroke-prone patients for the 
treatment or prevention of stroke, the claims are anticipated by the 
prior art dissertation and therefore invalid. Once the professor made 
the 2010 disclosure, the use of captopril for the treatment of stroke 
became part of the public domain; it follows that any later claims to 
the same use of captopril should be denied.9
Unfortunately, anticipation often becomes more convoluted than 
this example suggests. The anticipation analysis becomes 
considerably less clear when the prior art does not expressly disclose 
all of the claims of the subsequent invention.10 Even when a prior art 
disclosure does not expressly disclose all the claim limitations of a 
later invention, but performance of the method described in the prior 
art necessarily contains the undisclosed characteristics, the prior art 
still negates novelty because the undisclosed results are said to be 
“inherent” in the prior art.11 Properly understood, inherent 
 7. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 403 F.3d at 1342. Section 102(b) is sometimes referred 
to as the “statutory bar,” as distinguished from § 102(a), the “novelty” requirement. See
EZ Dock v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the 
“statutory bars”). Congress recently amended the Patent Act by adopting the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (the AIA). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-1249 
(2011). The AIA represents a massive shift in the way U.S. patents are granted under § 102(a), 
but does not appear to meaningfully change the operation of § 102(b) as it relates to inherent 
anticipation. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b). For further reading on the AIA, see Jason Rantanen & 
Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D., Toward A System of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24 (2011). 
 8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 9. See id.
 10. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Inherency is a very 
tricky concept in patent law.”). 
 11. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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anticipation serves as a gatekeeper, ensuring the important patent 
policy of promoting disclosure and only rewarding new inventions 
that are not already within the public domain.12 However, the Federal 
Circuit’s recent case law on inherent anticipation13 has produced a 
boundless conception of inherency that calls into question the 
doctrine’s fundamental purpose, casts a cloud of uncertainty over 
patent law, and threatens to undermine the vitality of the 
pharmaceutical industry, one of the most important industries in 
modern society. 
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions 
disregard decades of precedent on inherency, thereby creating an 
unbounded doctrine that not only fails to provide adequate 
predictability for inventors but also undermines the policy germane 
to inherency, and to patent law in general. Part II begins by 
examining the general framework of patentability and the historical 
policy considerations that have come to shape the Patent Act today. 
It then focuses on the early history of inherency through a series of 
Supreme Court and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals14 cases, 
and argues that inevitability was always the driving force in 
inherency. Finally, it inspects the Federal Circuit’s more recent, 
conflicting case law on recognition and inevitability. 
Part III begins by analyzing the Federal Circuit’s recent 
discordant approach to inherency. It highlights the lack of 
predictability in inherency over the last two decades, before focusing 
on the Federal Circuit’s recent inherency decision in In re 
Montgomery,15 in which the court called into question the meaning 
of inevitability, and therefore the scope and predictability of 
inherency generally. Part III then addresses the disconnect between 
the public policy underlying inherency and the use of bright line 
rules intended to promote the policy. The problematic nature of 
bright line rules in patent law is demonstrated by reference to another 
area of patent law—the requirement that a patented invention be 
 12. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 13. E.g., id.; Schering, 339 F.3d 1373. 
 14. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was the Federal Circuit’s predecessor 
court. See Newman, supra note 1, at 685. 
 15. 677 F.3d 1375. 
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nonobvious—in which the Supreme Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s similar use of rigid, bright line rules. 
Part IV sets forth a proposal that seeks to restore predictability 
to inherency by aligning the inherency analysis directly with the 
patent policy it seeks to promote. Finally, Part V concludes by 
reiterating the seriousness of the predictability problem in inherent 
anticipation, and calls for the appropriate institutional response. 
II. BACKGROUND
Congress has the power to grant patents under Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, commonly referred to as the 
Progress Clause.16 This clause is particularly unique, in that it 
describes the only enumerated power to set forth the specific means 
of exercising that power.17 It states that Congress shall have the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18 This limited 
grant is the result of a balancing of two critical concerns.19 On one 
hand, the framers wanted to promote scientific and technological 
invention, and thought patents were an effective means of carrying 
out such an endeavor.20 On the other hand, the framers were no doubt 
aware of the history of monopolistic abuses in England and thus 
wanted to ensure that patents were only granted on subject matter 
that actually advanced society by improving the arts and sciences.21
Thus, over time Congress has developed patentability requirements 
to ensure that issued patents do, indeed, “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”22
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 19. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Common Debates 1621, 52 L. Q. REV. 481, 487 (1936) 
(discussing King James I’s granting of odius monopolies); Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 65. 
 20. See Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 76. 
 21. See Holdsworth, supra note 19, at 487; Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 76;. 
 22. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000); see also Newman, supra note 1, at 685 
(discussing Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit to promote uniformity in patent law). 
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A.  Patentability 
In order for a patent to issue, the applicant must prove, among 
other things, that his or her invention is novel, useful, and 
nonobvious.23 The applicant must also disclose his or her method of 
making and using an invention in a manner sufficient to allow a 
person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to make and use 
it.24 With only minor exceptions, the patentee’s disclosure of what 
constitutes his or her invention is the fundamental basis of U.S. 
patent protection.25 That is, a patentee is entitled to enforce his or her 
patent only against unauthorized uses that encompass the patent 
application’s claims, and insufficient disclosure is a ground for 
invalidating patent claims.26
Put another way, the inventor’s disclosure in the patent 
application is the quid, and the twenty-year right to exclusive use is 
the quo. Without adequate disclosure, there is no quid pro quo; the 
public does not receive anything—or at least not enough—in 
exchange for the limited-term monopoly that is provided to the 
patentee.27 The novelty and disclosure requirements thus ensure that 
patents are issued on a limited set of inventions, and that the public 
and other PHOSITAs28 reap the benefits of the patented invention.29
The framers were concerned not only with striking this balance 
but also with predictability.30 The Articles of Confederation 
contained no provisions for federal patent protection, effectively 
 23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. 
 24. See id. § 112. 
 25. See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(holding that it is only what the inventor “claims” in his or her invention that is protected). 
 26. See id. In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3) sets forth failure to comply with any § 112 
disclosure requirement as an affirmative defense to infringement. 
 27. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 433–34 (1822) (arguing that the § 112 disclosures serve 
two goals: (1) to enable an artisan to make and use the invention; and (2) to put the public in 
possession of what the patentee claims as his own invention, “so as to ascertain if he claim 
anything that is in common use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice or injury 
from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be 
patented”).
 28. A person having ordinary skill in the art is commonly referred to by the acronym 
“PHOSITA.” 
 29. Evans, 20 U.S. at 435. 
 30. See Walterschied, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing the constitutional framers’ decision to 
create federal patent law in light of the inevitable conflict that would be created by allowing 
different patent laws to be promulgated by the states, as was allowed in the Articles of 
Confederation).
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leaving patent protection to the individual states.31 Concerned over 
the inevitable conflict that would result from state patent protection, 
the framers later included the Progress Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution.32
More recently, Congress has shown additional concern over 
uniformity and predictability in patent law.33 Its decision to create 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was motivated, at least 
in part, by concerns over inconsistent approaches of the regional 
circuits and the inevitable forum-shopping that resulted.34 Thus, the 
Progress Clause, which gives birth to the Patent Act itself, along with 
the appellate court designed to oversee patent law make clear that 
predictability is central to the U.S. patent system.35
B.  Inherent Anticipation 
The novelty requirement ensures that patents are only granted 
where an applicant contributes something new to society—thus 
striking a balance between affording patent protections to inventors 
and protecting the public from unreasonable expenses.36 To that end, 
if an invention was previously patented or described in a printed 
publication more than one year before the inventor files his or her 
patent application, the invention is said to be “anticipated” by the 
“prior art.”37 Anticipation negates novelty under § 102, and thus no 
patent can issue on anticipated subject matter.38
 31. See id.
 32. See id.
 33. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981) (arguing in favor of creating the Federal 
Circuit in order to combat the effects of “pro-patent” and “anti-patent” jurisdictions); Newman, 
supra note 1, at 685 (asserting Congress created the Federal Circuit to allow for “consistent 
application of the law”). 
 34. Newman, supra note 1, at 685. 
 35. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981); Walterschied, supra note 1, at 66.  
 36. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that inherency’s “salutary goal is to prevent subject matter that is effectively in the 
public's possession from being retrieved by a patent and withdrawn from the public domain”).  
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 102 states, “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention 
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.” Section 102(b) is 
sometimes referred to as the “statutory bar” as opposed to § 102(a), which is deemed the “true 
novelty” requirement; however, the anticipation analysis is the same under both sections. See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000). 
 38. Id. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (stating that a core 
concept of patent law is that anticipation undermines patentability). 
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Anticipation involves a two-step analysis.39 The first step 
requires construction of the claims at issue.40 Claim construction is a 
question of law in which the court gives the claims in question their 
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the patent 
specifications.41 Once claim construction is complete, the second 
step of the anticipation analysis involves comparing the claims in 
question to the prior art.42 Ordinarily, a single prior art reference 
anticipates a patent claim when it expressly discloses every claim 
limitation.43 However, the public can gain more from prior art than 
what is expressly disclosed. Thus, even where a single prior art 
reference does not expressly disclose all the limitations of the 
claimed invention, it may still anticipate inherently “if [the] missing 
characteristic[s] [are] necessarily present, or inherent, in the single 
anticipating reference.”44
Inherent anticipation is admittedly a tricky concept—it has 
puzzled judges, lawyers, inventors, and jurors for decades.45
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, along with 
its predecessor courts, have long agreed that a given characteristic 
could only anticipate inherently if it necessarily exists within a single 
prior art reference.46 In 1991, the Federal Circuit held that 
anticipation required not only that the undisclosed characteristics be 
inherent, but also that the missing characteristics be recognized by a 
person having ordinary skill in the art.47 This change in the law was 
short lived. Recent panel decisions have rejected the recognition 
 39. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1379. 
 40. Id.
 41. Id. at 1380–81. 
 42. Id.
 43. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 
2010).
 44. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citing Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). See
also In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[P]rior art [must] 
necessarily function[] in accordance with, or include[], the claimed limitations.”). 
 45. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Inherency is a very 
tricky concept in patent law.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 371, 372 (2005); Newman, supra note 1, at 685 (discussing the numerous concepts in patent 
law that puzzle jurors, judges, and lawyers alike). 
 46. E.g., Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)); Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 
214 (C.C.P.A. 1939). 
 47. See Cont’l Can, 948 F.2d at 1268. 
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requirement and held that anticipation requires only that the 
undisclosed characteristics inevitably flow from the single prior art 
reference and that the prior art enable a PHOSITA to practice the 
later claimed invention.48 Although the clash over recognition was 
short lived, it caused intra-circuit conflict and continues to cast a 
cloud of confusion over inherency.49
1. Tilghman, Eibel, and Other Early Inherency Cases 
Inherency is often traced back to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Tilghman v. Proctor.50 There, the patent in question claimed a 
method of forming fatty acids and glycerin by heating fats with water 
at high pressure.51 The prior art involved animal fat employed to 
lubricate pistons of steam engines, which might have produced fatty 
acids.52 The Court held that even if fatty acids were produced in the 
prior art, the prior art would not anticipate, because a PHOSITA
“certainly never derived the least hint from this accidental 
phenomenon in regard to any practicable process for manufacturing 
such acids.”53
Another early Supreme Court anticipation case is Eibel Process 
Company v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Company.54 Eibel’s claims 
involved a papermaking machine that employed paper-forming mesh 
with an elevated pitch that improved the quality of the resulting 
paper.55 Some prior art papermaking machines appeared to have 
employed pitched mesh, but not to the same degree as Eibel’s 
invention, and only for drainage.56 Citing Tilghman, the Court held 
 48. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Atlas 
Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this context, enablement—or 
an enabling disclosure—means that thedisclosure was sufficient to allow a PHOSITA to practice 
the claimed invention. 
 49. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting 
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling
Patent Law's Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1132 (2008); Alfredo De 
La Rosa, A Hard Pill to Swallow: Does Schering v. Geneva Endanger Innovation Within the 
Pharmaceutical Industry?, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 37 (2007). 
 50. 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 51. Id. at 709. 
 52. Id. at 711. 
 53. Id.
 54. 261 U.S. 45 (1923). 
 55. Id. at 65. 
 56. Id. at 66–67. 
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the prior art did not anticipate the new papermaking machines 
because, 
[i]n the first place, we find no evidence that any pitch of the 
wire, used before Eibel, had brought about such a result as 
that sought by him, and in the second place if it had done so 
under unusual conditions, accidental results, not intended 
and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation.57
The Federal Circuit’s predecessor patent court—the CCPA—
adopted the reasoning of Tilghman and Eibel, at least insofar as those 
cases held inherency requires inevitability.58 For example, in the 
1964 case In re Seaborg,59 the CCPA considered claims drawn to an 
isotope of americium, made by nuclear reaction.60 A prior art patent 
disclosed a similar nuclear reaction process, but did not disclose the 
claimed isotope.61 The court held the prior art process did not 
anticipate the claims because the isotope, “if it was produced in the 
[prior art] process, was produced in such minuscule amounts and 
under such conditions that its presence was undetectable.”62 Seaborg
makes clear that the mere fact that a certain thing might result from a 
given set of circumstances is insufficient to support a finding of 
inherency.63
It is important to note, however, that Seaborg contains no 
express language whatsoever regarding recognition.64 In fact, even as 
early as 1939 in Hansgirg v. Kemmer,65 the CCPA seemed only to 
 57. Id. at 66 (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711). 
 58. See, e.g., In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301 
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Felton, 484 F.2d 495 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 
(C.C.P.A. 1964).
 59. 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 60. Id. at 996. Americium (Am) is element 95 on the periodic table. Id. It may strike some 
readers as strange that an element on the periodic table can be patented. A naturally occurring 
mineral, such as iron, even if newly discovered, cannot be patented because such subject matter is 
deemed patent ineligible. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“[A] new 
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject 
matter.”). However, americium is a “man made” radioactive isotope that does not exist in nature, 
which means it is not subject matter ineligible. See, e.g., id. at 310 (explaining that the patentee’s 
modified bacteria had “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature” and was “not 
nature's handiwork, but his own,” thus rendering it patentable subject matter). 
 61. In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 996–97. 
 62. Id. at 998–99. 
 63. Id.
 64. Id.
 65. 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939). 
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focus on inevitability and enablement.66 In Hansgirg, the court held 
inherency requires “that the natural [i.e., inevitable] result flowing 
from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the 
questioned function.”67 The court’s emphasis on “as taught” is 
important: it did not hold that a PHOSITA needed to apprehend the 
undisclosed result; rather, it required that the prior art “teach”—that 
is, enable one of ordinary skill to carry out—an operation that would 
inevitably produce the undisclosed result.68 However, in the 1991 
case of Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,69 the 
Federal Circuit held otherwise.70
2. Continental Can and the Short-Lived 
Per Se Recognition Requirement 
Judge Newman, writing for a unanimous panel in Continental 
Can, explained that inherent anticipation required that the pertinent 
evidence “make clear that the missing descriptive matter is 
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it 
would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.”71
Subsequently, courts cited Continental Can with apparent approval 
in anticipation cases through 1999,72 until the tide turned yet again.73
Toward the end of 1999, the Federal Circuit began chipping 
away at the recognition requirement announced in Continental 
Can.74 In Atlas Powder v. Ireco, Inc.,75 writing for a unanimous 
panel of the court, Judge Rader opined, “Inherency is not necessarily 
coterminous with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. 
Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent 
 66. See id.
 67. Id.
 68. Id.
 69. 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 70. Id. at 1268 (“To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted 
inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic 
evidence. Such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily 
present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of 
ordinary skill.” (emphasis added)). 
 71. Id.
 72. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying the anticipation 
analysis from Continental Can).
 73. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 74. Id.
 75. Id. at 1347. 
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characteristics or functioning of the prior art.”76 Judge Rader went on 
to explain that the purpose of § 102 is to ensure that a claimed 
invention does not take something away from the public that is 
already in its possession.77 Thus, it should be irrelevant “whether or 
not [a PHOSITA] understand[s] [the prior art’s] complete makeup or 
the underlying scientific principles which allow [it] to operate.”78
Atlas Powder did not uniformly reject the recognition 
requirement; instead it explained that recognition was not probative 
of inherency on that set of facts.79 Four years later, the panel in 
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals80 uniformly rejected 
recognition, in an attempt to return the law of inherency to its pre-
Continental Can roots.81 However, the Federal Circuit declined to 
restore full clarity to inherency by deciding the case en banc.82
Schering concerned a prior art patent for the antihistamine 
loratadine—marketed by Schering as Claritin®—and a subsequent 
patent granted to Schering for a metabolite of loratadine, 
descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL).83 DCL formed naturally upon 
human consumption and metabolization of loratadine, which was 
patented more than one year before Schering filed their patent 
application on DCL.84 Upon expiration of the loratadine patent, 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals sought to enter the loratadine market.85
Schering filed suit alleging infringement of their DCL patent on the 
ground that DCL forms upon consumption of loratadine.86 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Geneva, holding 
 76. Id.
 77. Id. at 1348 (“The public remains free to make, use, or sell prior art compositions or 
processes, regardless of whether or not they understand their complete makeup or the underlying 
scientific principles which allow them to operate. The doctrine of anticipation by inherency, 
among other doctrines, enforces that basic principle.”). 
 78. Id.
 79. See id.
 80. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 81. Id. at 1377. 
 82. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (denying 
rehearing en banc); see also id. at 993 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en 
banc).
 83. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1375. 
 84. Id.
 85. Id. at 1376. 
 86. Id.
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that the claims in the loratadine patent inherently anticipated the 
DCL claims, which were therefore invalid.87
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began its opinion by boldly 
asserting, “At the outset, this court rejects the contention that 
inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”88
Interestingly, the Schering panel distinguished Continental Can
procedurally by characterizing Continental Can as merely vacating a 
summary judgment grant based on conflicting testimony regarding 
whether the claimed process was necessarily formed in the prior 
art.89 In other words, Judge Newman’s language regarding 
recognition was cloaked as mere dicta. Likewise, Tilghman and Eibel
were said to have involved a lack of evidence that the allegedly 
inherent subject matter was present in the prior art—not the issue of 
recognition.90 Accordingly, because Schering’s loratadine patent, the 
pertinent prior art, disclosed administration of loratadine to people, 
and the administration of loratadine to people inevitably produces 
DCL, the loratadine patent inherently anticipated the DCL claim.91
3. In re Montgomery—The End of Inevitability? 
On May 8, 2012, nearly a decade after deciding Schering, the 
Federal Circuit decided In re Montgomery.92 There, Montgomery 
filed an application for a method of use patent claiming the treatment 
or prevention of stroke by administering ramipril, a rennin-
angiotensin system (RAS) inhibitor, to stroke-prone patients.93 The 
 87. Id.
 88. Id. at 1377. 
 89. Id. (“In Continental Can, this court vacated summary judgment of anticipation of claims 
reciting a plastic bottle with hollow ribs over a prior art reference disclosing a plastic bottle . . . 
[because] [t]he record contained conflicting expert testimony about whether the ribs of the prior 
art plastic bottle were solid.”). 
 90. Id. at 1378. 
 91. Id. at 1380. 
 92. 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 93. Id. at 1377. There were actually three claims at issue in In re Montgomery, which read as 
follows: 
42. A method for the treatment or prevention of stroke or its recurrence, wherein said 
method comprises administering, to a patient diagnosed as in need of such treatment or 
prevention, an inhibitor of the rennin-angiotensin system, said inhibitor having a Clog 
P of greater than about 1. 
43. The method as claimed in claim 42, wherein the inhibitor of the rennin-angiotensin 
system comprises at least one inhibitor of angiotensin-converting enzyme. 
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application was filed on April 25, 2005, claiming priority to United 
Kingdom patent applications dated October 17, 1997, and May 20, 
1998, respectively.94 The PTO examiner rejected Montgomery’s 
claims as anticipated, and the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection.95
Montgomery appealed the rejection to the Federal Circuit, 
arguing that the prior art reference at issue in the appeal—a 
publication describing the HOPE96 study—was merely a proposal for 
future research and that the publication failed to enable a PHOSITA 
to practice the claimed invention.97 HOPE was published in February 
1996, more than one year before Montgomery’s priority date, and 
describes the “design” of “a large, randomized clinical trial of the 
efficacy of . . . ramipril, and of a naturally occurring antioxidant, 
vitamin E, in reducing myocardial infarction (MI), stroke, or 
[cardiovascular disease] death in over 9000 men and women at high 
risk of CVD.”98
In other words, HOPE described a study that sought to test 
whether or not a combination of ramipril and vitamin E would 
reduce the risk of death from stroke and other cardiovascular 
diseases in a random sample of patients.99 It provided no disclosure 
that ramipril would reduce the risk of stroke death—effectively 
leaving those who read it to speculate whether it would increase or 
decrease that risk.100 HOPE even “provide[ed] specific criteria for 
‘early termination’ if the proposed treatment [was] ineffective.”101
45. The method as claimed in claim 43, wherein the inhibitor of angiotensin-converting 
enzyme comprises ramipril. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). Because the parties agreed that claim 45 incorporates claims 42 and 43, 
the court only addressed claim 45. Id. at 1380 n.9. 
 94. Id. at 1376. 
 95. Id. at 1377–78. 
 96. HOPE is an acronym for Heart Outcomes Prevention Evaluation. The HOPE Study 
Investigators, The HOPE (Heart Outcomes Prevention Evaluation) Study: The Design of a Large, 
Simple Randomized Trial of an Angiotensin–Converting Enzyme Inhibitor (Ramipril) and Vitamin 
E in Patients at High Risk of Cardiovascular Events, 12 CAN. J. CARDIOLOGY 127 (1996) 
[hereinafter HOPE].
 97. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1379. 
 98. Id. at 1378; HOPE, supra note 96, at 127. 
 99. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378. 
 100. Id. at 1381–83. 
 101. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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This exit strategy is significant, but not surprising. RAS 
inhibitors, like ramipril, reduce hypertension yet, at the time, had 
been shown to paradoxically increase stroke risk.102 In fact, AIRE, 
one of the four studies cited by the Board in its rejection of 
Montgomery’s claims, found that ramipril actually increased the risk 
of stroke.103 In 2000, years after Montgomery’s priority date, the 
authors of HOPE published the results of the study they described, 
which found that administration of ramipril to stroke-prone patients 
effectively decreased the risk of stroke-related deaths.104 However, 
because the second HOPE reference was published years after 
Montgomery’s priority date, the entire panel agreed it was 
“irrelevant” to the anticipation analysis.105
A majority of the three-judge Federal Circuit panel rejected 
Montgomery’s arguments and held that HOPE inherently anticipated 
his claims.106 Judge Lourie, who had also dissented from the denial 
of rehearing en banc in Schering, filed a dissenting opinion.107 The 
entire panel agreed that HOPE did not expressly disclose effective 
treatment or prevention of stroke, such that it could only anticipate 
Montgomery’s claims inherently; it diverged, however, on whether 
treatment of stroke was inevitable based on the HOPE reference and 
on whether HOPE was enabling.108
The majority held that because “HOPE disclose[d] a protocol for 
the administration of ramipril to stroke-prone patients, and 
administering ramipril to stroke-prone patients inevitably treats or 
prevents stroke,” HOPE inherently anticipated Montgomery’s 
 102. Brief for Appellant at 2–4, In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 11-
1367), 2011 WL 454279, at *2–6 (reproducing the results of the AIRE study to demonstrate 
ramipril increased the risk of stroke by 43 percent); The Acute Infarction Ramipril Efficacy 
(AIRE) Study Investigators, Effect of Ramipril on Mortality and Morbidity of Survivors of Acute 
Myocardial Infarction with Clinical Evidence of Heart Failure, 342 LANCET 821 (1993) 
[hereinafter AIRE].
 103. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 102, at 2–4 (reproducing the results of the AIRE 
study to demonstrate ramipril increased the risk of stroke by 43 percent).
 104. See The HOPE Study Investigators, Effects of an Angiotensin–Converting–Enzyme 
Inhibitor, Ramipril, on Cardiovascular Events in High–Risk Patients, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
145, 148 tbl.3 (2000) [hereinafter HOPE II].
 105. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378 (majority opinion); id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., 
dissenting).
 106. Id. at 1383 (majority opinion). 
 107. See id. (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 108. Compare id. at 1381–83 (majority opinion), with id. at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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claims.109 Invoking strong language from Schering, the court 
reminded the dissent that “anticipation ‘requires only an enabling 
disclosure,’ not ‘actual creation or reduction to practice,’ so that 
‘actual administration of [ramipril] to patients [in the prior art] is 
irrelevant.’”110 The majority concluded by dismissing Judge Lourie’s 
characterization of HOPE as a mere “invitation to investigate” that 
was not enabling.111 To the majority, HOPE was “an advanced stage 
of testing designed to secure regulatory approval.”112
Judge Lourie began his dissent by clearly delineating his side of 
the inherency debate.113 He critiqued the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Schering and argued that, when properly understood, inherency is 
“much more limited.”114 His dissent emphasized that HOPE 
described no more than a design for a study that, at least to him, had 
not actually been carried out, and thus could not have disclosed any 
results whatsoever—let alone inevitable results. Additionally, 
because it disclosed no results on efficacy, it also failed to enable a 
PHOSITA to treat or prevent stroke.115 Judge Lourie argued that 
HOPE was simply too indeterminate to be deemed inevitable. 
Regardless of whether HOPE was an advanced stage of testing, it 
was no more than the description of a study that required four years 
of testing to produce data sufficient to demonstrate efficacy. In other 
words, it was anything but inevitable.116 To that end, in order to find 
inevitability, Judge Lourie argued that the majority reached outside 
the scope of HOPE (and of the record in general) and relied on the 
second HOPE disclosure, published years after Montgomery’s 
priority date, to find inherency.117
 109. Id. at 1381–82 (majority opinion). 
 110. Id. at 1382 (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)).
 111. Id. (quoting Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 112. Id.
 113. Id. at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 114. See id. 1383–84 (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880)). Judge Lourie 
also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in Schering, along with Judge Newman. See
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting 
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc). 
 115. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1384 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id.
 117. See id. at 1385. 
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III. INHERENCY, PREDICTABILITY, AND BRIGHT-LINE RULES
The importance of uniformity and predictability applies a
fortiori in industries where development costs are high, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry.118 Taking into account the cost of failures, 
one study suggests that the “average drug developed by a major 
pharmaceutical company costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as 
much as $11 billion.”119 Given that successful drugs can generate 
billions of dollars in profits for their manufacturers, such costs can be 
justifiable.120 Of course, this presupposes that manufacturers are 
afforded a sufficiently uniform system of patent law from which to 
predict whether their drug or medical device will be worthy of patent 
protection.121 At the same time, the importance of encouraging 
pharmaceutical research through ensuring predictable patent 
protection must be balanced with the manifest interest of society in 
receiving new and useful pharmaceuticals at cost-effective prices.122
Congress has already recognized the unique nature of 
pharmaceutical patent protection.123 The Hatch-Waxman Act, passed 
in 1984, allows pharmaceutical patents to be extended when delays 
in obtaining FDA approval significantly reduce the amount of time 
the patentee can exclusively market the patented pharmaceutical.124
This clearly promotes pharmaceutical research and development. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act also allows generic drug manufacturers to begin 
testing the patented pharmaceutical technology during the extended 
time frame, which permits cost-effective generics to be marketed to 
the public as soon as the patent term expires.125 Despite Congress’s 
response to the unique nature of pharmaceutical patents, the Federal 
Circuit’s inherency decisions treat complex pharmaceutical processes 
 118. Id. at 1384. 
 119. See Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES.COM
(Feb. 10, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-
staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/.
 120. See id.
 121. See De La Rosa, supra note 49. 
 122. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2011). 
 123. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2011) (codifying 
Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 124. 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
 125. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355. For further reading on the intricacies of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
see Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, 
the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417 (2011). 
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 188 S
ide A
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 188 Side A      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
UNBOUND CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY 9/10/2014 6:48 PM 
Fall 2013]    UNBOUNDED CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY 363 
as if they involve the same kind of technology as any other 
invention.
A.  Predictability in Inherency 
The last decade of precedent on inherent anticipation is anything 
but predictable.126 Schering prompted significant dissention within 
the Federal Circuit and the patent bar at large.127 In the decade since 
Schering was decided, the intra-circuit battle over recognition 
remains largely unsettled.128 The Federal Circuit has had the ability 
to clarify the law of inherent anticipation in various cases, but it has 
instead rejected opportunities to hear the cases en banc.129 Indeed, in 
at least one instance, instead of clarifying the state of the law, the 
Federal Circuit simply vacated a panel opinion requiring recognition 
and remanded the underlying matter to the district court.130 Given 
that this posture has more or less forced application of the Schering
articulation of the law, it is fair to say that Continental Can has been 
rejected.131 However, some unpublished Federal Circuit opinions 
continue to cite directly to Continental Can for the proposition that 
inherency does require recognition, while the published opinions 
continue to assert that recognition is not required, though not without 
prompting dissents.132 Everyone deserves uniform protection, but the 
 126. See, e.g., Haberman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 236 F. App’x 592, 598 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 
Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (not designated for 
publication). See also In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J., 
dissenting) (critiquing the inherency rule announced in Schering).
 127. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting 
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling
Patent Law's Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1132 (2008); De La Rosa, 
supra note 49, at 87. 
 128. See, e.g., Haberman, 236 F. App'x at 598 (citing Cont’l Can Co., 948 F.2d at 1268) (not 
designated for publication). See also In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) 
(critiquing the inherency rule announced in Schering). 
 129. See, e.g., Schering, 348 F.3d at 992 (majority opinion) (denying petition for rehearing en 
banc); Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (denying petition for rehearing en banc). 
 130. See Elan Pharm., 314 F.3d at 1299 (granting rehearing en banc, but declining to address 
the issue in an en banc decision and instead simply vacating the panel opinion and remanding to 
district court). 
 131. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1375 (rejecting recognition); SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting recognition).  
 132. Compare Haberman, 236 F. App’x at 598 (requiring recognition), with SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 403 F.3d at 1343 (rejecting recognition); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 
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Federal Circuit’s internal conflict concerning the nature of inherency 
denies uniform, predictable patent protection—at least where the 
dispute concerns recognition in an inherency analysis. Despite the 
uncertainty and turmoil surrounding the post-Continental Can cases 
rejecting recognition, at least one aspect of inherency law seemed 
clear: inevitability is the touchstone of inherency.133
Before, and even after Schering, the Federal Circuit required 
that the undisclosed, i.e., inherent, result flow with something 
tantamount to statistical necessity from the operation as taught in the 
prior art.134 For example, in the 1995 case Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm 
Ltd.,135 the Federal Circuit refused to find that a prior art process 
inherently anticipated a later claim directed at crystals—even though 
the defendant’s experts reproduced the crystals using a prior art 
process each of thirteen times—because the plaintiffs twice produced 
different crystals using the same process.136 Schering was consistent 
with Glaxo, insofar as the court found DCL formed naturally upon 
human consumption of the prior art loratadine.137
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex,138 the Federal Circuit 
arguably began to loosen the strict necessity requirement. However, 
the holding is best understood as addressing the burden on the party 
seeking to invalidate an issued patent.139 There, the district court 
found in favor of SmithKline Beecham, the plaintiff-patentee suing 
for infringement, because the defendant “did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it was impossible to make [a pure version 
of the prior art compound with no trace elements of the allegedly 
F.3d 1373, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting recognition). Cf. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 
(Lourie, J., dissenting) (critiquing the inherency rule announced in Schering). 
 133. No inherency case questions the inevitability requirement. See generally Schering, 339 
F.3d at 1377 (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed 
invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single 
anticipating reference.”); Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (requiring, in addition to recognition, that the pertinent evidence “make clear that the 
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described”). 
 134. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 135. Id.
 136. See id.; In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 998–99 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding that the prior art 
process did not anticipate the claims because the process would have produced at most one 
billionth of a gram of the isotope in forty tons of radioactive material). 
 137. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380. 
 138. 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 139. Id.
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 189 S
ide A
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 189 Side A      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
UNBOUND CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY 9/10/2014 6:48 PM 
Fall 2013]    UNBOUNDED CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY 365 
anticipated compound] in the United States before the critical date” 
of the plaintiff’s patent.140 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that 
“[t]he district court erred in requiring Apotex to meet [that] standard 
of proof, which [was] too exacting.”141 Instead, the court held that a 
reference “suffices as an anticipatory prior art reference if it discloses 
in an enabling manner” the production of the later-claimed 
invention.142 Thus, because the prior art “disclose[d] a method . . . 
that naturally results in the production of [the claimed compound],” 
the court found the claimed compound was inherently anticipated by 
the prior art.143 SmithKline Beecham is thus consistent with pre-
Schering cases requiring strict necessity.144 However, in their 2012 
decision in In re Montgomery, the Federal Circuit calls even 
inevitability into question.145
Reading Continental Can, then Schering, followed by In re 
Montgomery, would likely lead to confusion. This confusion is not 
only because the recognition requirement from Continental Can was 
rejected in Schering and would have foreclosed a finding of inherent 
anticipation in In re Montgomery,146 but also because it is difficult to 
square In re Montgomery with any prior cases on inherent 
anticipation—it effectively eviscerated the requirement that the 
inherent characteristics be “necessarily” present in the prior art 
disclosure.147 Judge Lourie was correct when he said that nothing 
properly before the court indicated that stroke treatment or 
prevention was a necessary result of the process described in 
HOPE.148 Prior to the fallout from Schering, and indeed even in 
Schering, the Federal Circuit pointed to actual record evidence 
establishing that the undisclosed result necessarily resulted from the 
process in question with something resembling statistical 
 140. Id. at 1343 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 1344 (citing Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380). 
 143. Id.
 144. See id.; Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (requiring, in addition to recognition, that the pertinent evidence “make clear that the 
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described”). 
 145. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 146. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1375; Schering, 339 F.3d at 1381; Cont’l Can Co.,
948 F.2d at 1268.  
 147. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 1385. 
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necessity.149 In In re Montgomery, the Federal Circuit found 
necessity by pointing to the mere description of a proposed study that 
said absolutely nothing about whether ramipril would treat stroke.150
In essence, the majority found it sufficient to say that HOPE could
have been carried out, and if carried out it would have—or at least 
should have—shown that ramipril possesses stroke-prevention 
qualities.151 However, despite the majority’s belief, “could have, 
would have, should have” is not the law: strict necessity is.152
The counterargument is that what Judge Lourie argues for in In
re Montgomery is no more than a disguised recognition requirement. 
After all, the first step Judge Lourie took in his dissenting opinion 
was to critique Schering for the overly broad conception of inherency 
it produced.153 In other words, to require inevitability be shown 
contemporaneously requires record evidence that would 
independently satisfy the recognition requirement.154 But Judge 
Lourie did not demand something tantamount to recognition without 
having a reasonable basis for doing so.155 Indeed, even ignoring 
Schering and Continental Can, there is an argument that Supreme 
Court precedent from Tilghman and Eibel requires something 
resembling recognition—at least in certain instances. The Supreme 
Court rested its holdings in both Tilghman and Eibel, at least in part, 
on the fact that the records lacked evidence establishing that the prior 
art actually employed the newly patented techniques.156 That is, the 
records did not establish that the prior art necessarily contained the 
 149. See, e.g., Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
 150. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378; see also id. at 1384 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“As the 
majority acknowledges, the references do not expressly disclose this claimed method. Nor is the 
claimed method an inherent result of carrying out what the references describe.”). 
 151. Compare id. at 1382–83 (majority opinion) (arguing “even if HOPE merely proposed the 
administration of Ramipril for treatment or prevention of stroke (without actually doing so), it 
would still anticipate”), with id. at 1385 (Lourie, J. dissenting) (“[A] mere description of a 
process that, if it had been carried out, might yield a particular undisclosed result is not an 
inherent anticipation of that result.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 152. See Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (“Inherency . . . may not 
be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from 
a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”). 
 153. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383–84 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 154. See id. at 1382–83 (majority opinion). 
 155. See id. at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 
(1880)).
 156. Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman, 102 
U.S. 707. 
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later claimed invention.157 However, the Court did state, as a second 
ground, that “accidental results” which are “not intended and not 
appreciated” cannot constitute anticipation.158 Whether the Court 
meant to include a “per se” requirement that a PHOSITA 
appreciate—i.e., recognize—the undisclosed characteristic is open to 
debate. Indeed, as cases like Atlas Powder and Schering make clear, 
the Federal Circuit continues to vigorously debate the meaning and 
significance of the Court’s holdings in Tilghman and Eibel; the 
judges are not in agreement.159
Disagreement over “per se” recognition notwithstanding, in a 
situation like the one presented in In re Montgomery, there is a 
significantly large gap between requiring contemporaneous 
recognition and demanding a showing of inevitability that adequately 
protects the investment of the patent applicant.160
HOPE described a massive, complicated, long-term study of the 
efficacy of ramipril in treating or preventing a number of 
cardiovascular diseases.161 The fact that it took the HOPE authors 
roughly four years to publish the results of their proposed study is 
informative: the outcome of the study was anything but 
preordained.162 In fact, the exact study described in the HOPE 
publication never happened.163 The authors had to alter the study to 
account for lag time, meaning the study used by the majority to 
invalidate Montgomery’s claims was never carried out.164
Consequently, HOPE, as described before Montgomery’s priority 
date, was no more than an aspiration; it was, as its name suggests, 
only a “hope.” 
 157. Eibel, 261 U.S. at 45. 
 158. Id. at 66 (emphasis added) (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711). 
 159. Compare Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(distinguishing Tilghman and Eibel as “accidental” anticipation cases involving a lack of 
evidence establishing inevitability), with In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383–84 (Lourie, J., 
dissenting) (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711) (“Properly understood [under Tilghman], 
anticipation by inherency is far more limited.”). 
 160. While requiring contemporaneous evidence of inevitability is essentially the same as 
requiring that a PHOSITA would have, or should have, recognized the undisclosed characteristics 
in the prior art, to require a sufficiently “definite” showing of inevitability based on the prior art 
disclosure is not at all tantamount to recognition. 
 161. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378 (majority opinion). 
 162. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id.
 164. Id.
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Moreover, though the appellate record in In re Montgomery was 
silent on the results of the HOPE study, the record contained 
evidence from the AIRE study indicating that ramipril could actually 
increase the likelihood of stroke, or at the very least, had no relevant 
effect on stroke.165 The PTO examiner, the Board, and the majority 
of the Federal Circuit dismissed this data as irrelevant by arguing 
that evidence of “teaching away” is limited to an obviousness 
analysis under § 103.166 Teaching away is, no doubt, an obviousness 
consideration.167 But how does a process “necessarily” produce a 
given result if multiple results are possible? Logically, prior 
precedent in cases such as Glaxo held that it could not.168 In In re 
Montgomery, the prior art is no more than the description of a study 
that disclosed absolutely nothing regarding efficacy, included 
specific criteria for early termination, and—insofar as it was 
modified after publication—was never realized.169 “Inherency
follows from the carrying out of an activity that inherently produces 
what is claimed; [it] does not arise from a plan whose description 
does not indicate its realization.”170
In re Montgomery thus departs from prior cases on inherency, 
not only by finding necessity despite evidence that the undisclosed 
characteristics were not always produced by the prior art but also by 
finding necessity through the mere design of a study that was never 
carried out.171 If inherency can be established through prior art as 
indeterminate as a description of a proposed study, the scope of 
inherent anticipation is dangerously boundless.172 Indeed, “every 
 165. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 102, at 2–4 (reproducing the results of the AIRE 
study to demonstrate ramipril increased the risk of stroke by 43 percent, or at minimum had no 
effect on stroke prevention).
 166. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1381 n.11 (majority opinion). 
 167. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966) (“[K]nown disadvantages in old 
devices which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into 
account in determining obviousness.”); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 
1550–51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (the totality of a reference's teachings must be considered in an 
obviousness analysis). See also In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the 
relationship between a prima facie face of obviousness and teaching away as a secondary 
consideration capable of rebutting a prima facie showing of obviousness). 
 168. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 169. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378; id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id.
 172. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
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biological property is the natural and inherent result of the chemical 
structure from which it arises.”173 Thus, under the law of inherency 
as announced in In re Montgomery, the mere recitation of a process 
involving a prior art compound, with essentially no enabling 
disclosure, is sufficient to negate a later patent directed at that 
process, regardless of whether the prior art disclosed efficacy or was 
intended to cure the ailment at issue.174
Predictability is always important in law, but uncertainty is 
particularly problematic in the pharmaceutical context.175 Given the 
staggering cost of pharmaceutical research and development, 
pharmaceutical companies need to have a clear understanding of 
what will anticipate and what will not, so as to invest prudently.176
Moreover, while there are various types of litigation insurance a 
company can take out to protect against unanticipated changes in the 
law, there is no insurance that can ameliorate the negative 
consequences of a patent being invalidated due to shifting 
articulation of the law.177
B.  Bright-Line Rules are Often Inadequate at Protecting the Policy 
Interests at Stake in Patent Law 
The purpose of § 102 is to ensure that a claimed invention does 
not take something away from the public that was already in their 
possession.178 To that end, it is consistent with the public policy 
behind patent law for a prior art publication to anticipate without 
expressly disclosing all limiting characteristics of the later claimed 
 173. Id.
 174. See id.; see also In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378–83 (invalidating patent as 
inherently anticipated even where prior art did not disclose efficacy). 
 175. E.g., Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383-84 (Lourie, J, dissenting). . 
 176. See supra Part II. 
 177. See generally Insurance Coverage, A.B.A. (Jan. 17, 2003), http://apps.americanbar.org 
/litigation/committees/insurance/ (discussing litigation insurance coverage). Intellectual property 
insurance generally comes in two forms: (1) “defensive” insurance that allows companies to 
insure their assets against future infringement claims, and (2) “offensive” insurance—known as 
abatement insurance—for companies seeking to bolster their ability to enforce their intellectual 
property rights. Ian McClure, Intellectual Property Insurance: Transforming the Economic Model 
for IP Litigation, 57 FED. LAW. 18, 18 (2010). Of course, these forms of insurance cover the costs 
of litigating patent infringement; they do not indemnify a patent holder against future losses that 
stem from an inability to enforce patent rights subsequent to a finding of patent invalidity. Id.
 178. See Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, 
Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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invention, even where no one recognizes the undisclosed result.179
Indeed, there is no language in § 102 that discusses recognition or 
even inevitability.180 Rather, both are judicial creations that seek an 
appropriate balance—ensuring that subject matter already within the 
public domain is not later taken away from the public on the one 
hand, and fostering scientific research and development through 
patent grants on the other.181
In the early shift away from Continental Can’s bright-line 
recognition requirement in Atlas Power, Judge Rader’s assertion that 
inherency and recognition are not necessarily coterminous accurately 
summarizes the relationship between public disclosure and the patent 
policy of promoting scientific progress.182 Judge Rader’s opinion in 
Atlas Powder acknowledges that there are times when recognition is 
not relevant to an anticipation analysis, such as patents involving 
compositions of matter.183 These patents are different because a 
patent on a composition of matter provides the patentee with the 
exclusive right to exclude all uses of the composition.184 This holds 
true in Schering, where DCL, the metabolite of loratadine, formed 
upon human metabolization of loratadine.185 DCL is a composition 
of matter; thus, a patent on DCL carries with it the right to exclude 
the public from using DCL in any form, including the use of 
loratadine, given that DCL necessarily forms upon consumption of 
loratadine.186
 179. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Atlas Powder, 190 
F.3d at 1347. 
 180. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 181. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 182. See Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1347. 
 183. Id.
 184. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (listing composition of matter as patentable subject matter); 
§ 271(a) (providing remedy for infringement). 
 185. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 186. This was the very premise of Schering’s infringement action against Geneva, i.e., that 
use of loratadine necessarily leads to production of the metabolite DCL. Id. Indeed, Judge 
Newman’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Schering implies that the majority was 
overly concerned with the issue of infringement and whether it would be equitable to permit 
infringement in the situation presented in Schering. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 
348 F.3d 992, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Newman believes the panel reached the appropriate 
result—that is, a finding of no liability—but that they took the wrong steps and muddled the law 
of inherency to arrive there. Id. Instead of deciding the case on infringement grounds, which may 
or may not have required the crafting of an exception of some sort, Newman argues the panel 
misapplied inherency law to invalidate the patent. See id. (“[I]nstead of simply ruling that 
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Conversely, a method of use patent, such as the one at issue in 
In re Montgomery, applies only to a particularized, i.e., problem 
specific, process; that process must be carried out in full for 
infringement liability to attach.187 The claims at issue in In re 
Montgomery only involved application of ramipril for stroke 
treatment, and would not remove ramipril from the public domain in 
the same manner that Schering’s DCL patent did. Even if 
Montgomery’s patent issued, ramipril could be used to treat 
hypertension, as it had been used before Montgomery’s patent 
application or the HOPE study.188
At least with respect to method of use patents in the 
pharmaceutical context, recognition seems to play some indirect role 
in deciding whether the public actually possessed the inherent 
characteristic of efficacy, whether the disclosure was enabling, and 
whether the undisclosed result was inevitable based on the prior 
art.189 There is little question that ramipril does effectively treat 
stroke,190 but the primary concern in In re Montgomery was whether 
HOPE inherently disclosed that effective treatment before 
Montgomery’s patent application. If no one—including the HOPE 
authors—recognized the stroke-preventing characteristics of 
ramipril, can the public really be said to “possess” this knowledge in 
the same way they possessed the DCL compound? A PHOSITA was 
not put on notice that ramipril treats stroke based on the HOPE 
disclosure’s description of a proposed research study.191 Therefore, 
although a per se recognition requirement is unnecessary, the concept 
Schering cannot prevent the practice of the expired patent in accordance with its teachings, the 
panel strains to hold that this newly discovered, previously unknown product cannot be validly 
patented. That is not the law. [Newman] also point[ed] out that the issue here is validity, not 
infringement.”).
 187. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (“Direct 
infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of a claimed 
method or product.”); see also id. at 1379 (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 
(Fed. Cir. 1993)) (“For process patent or method patent claims, infringement occurs when a party 
performs all of the steps of the process.”). 
 188. Montgomery’s claims only involved a method of administering ramipril to stroke prone 
patients. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also U.S. Patent No. 
20,050,192,326 (filed Apr. 29, 2005) (Montgomery’s patent application). He did not, and could 
not have, claimed exclusive rights in the compound ramipril.
 189. Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 1378 n.8 (majority opinion); see also HOPE II, supra note 104, at 148 tbl.3 
(publishing results of the HOPE study). 
 191. See Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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of recognition should play some role in informing the otherwise 
relevant inherency inquiries,192 at least in pharmaceutical patent 
cases.193 Yet the majority of the Federal Circuit’s categorical 
rejection of recognition, and anything that resembles recognition, 
forecloses the ability to pursue this seemingly inescapable overlap.194
Inherency is further obfuscated by the In re Montgomery
majority’s rejection of the argument that the AIRE study foreclosed a 
finding of inevitability. AIRE was published just before HOPE and 
found that ramipril either increased stroke risk or had no meaningful 
effect on stroke prevention.195 This seems to indicate that the natural 
result of the operation as taught was not necessarily treatment or 
prevention of stroke.196 The majority in In re Montgomery was so 
quick to resort to a bright line rejection of “teaching away” as a 
consideration limited to obviousness that it failed to consider the 
implications on the question of inevitability.197 It seems questionable 
that an undisclosed result can be said to “necessarily” flow from a 
publication describing a proposed study that took no position on its 
outcome, was modified after publication, and did not produce results 
for nearly a half decade.198 But it is entirely implausible that an 
undisclosed result necessarily flows from such a disclosure when a 
similar process, carried out beforehand, produced contradictory 
results.199 Despite these shortcomings, the majority of the Federal 
Circuit panel in In re Montgomery found inherency.200
If the Federal Circuit’s precedent on inherent anticipation 
teaches us anything, it is that rigid, bright-line rules fail to adequately 
address the public policy goals of patent law.201 By focusing the 
inherency analysis on bright-line definitions of inevitability and 
enablement and by categorically rejecting recognition, the Federal 
Circuit’s recent inherency cases produce results that are not only 
 192. E.g., inevitability, enablement, and the policy germane to inherency. 
 193. See, e.g., Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385–86 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 194. See id. at 1381–83 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 1381 n.11. 
 196. Cf. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 197. Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1381. 
 198. See id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id.
 200. Id. at 1383 (majority opinion). 
 201. See id. at 1383–84 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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unpredictable but also questionable in light of the patent policy at 
issue.202
The Supreme Court has previously highlighted the 
ineffectiveness of bright-line rules in another area of patent law.203 In 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,204 the Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s bright-line test for obviousness finding “[r]igid 
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common 
sense . . . [are] neither necessary under . . . nor consistent with” the 
Court’s precedent.205 Instead of supporting a bright-line rule, the 
Supreme Court instructed the Federal Circuit to apply an “expansive 
and flexible approach” to the question of obviousness.206 Despite 
announcing this “common sense” approach to obviousness, the Court 
was sure to underscore the fact that its precedent “recognized the 
need for ‘uniformity and definiteness’” in patent law matters.207
However, because obviousness—like inherency—applies to the 
entire gambit of patentable subject matter, the Court found that a 
“functional approach” to obviousness was the appropriate choice.208
An expansive and flexible approach to the question of inherency is 
equally necessary, especially in the context of pharmaceutical 
patents, given Congress’s unique treatment of pharmaceuticals under 
Hatch-Waxman.209
IV. A FLEXIBLE, COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO INHERENCY
To resolve the lack of predictability in inherent anticipation once 
and for all, the Federal Circuit needs to do what it could have done 
decades ago after Continental Can was decided: take an inherent 
anticipation case en banc and set forth a clear standard for inherent 
 202. See id.
 203. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 204. Id.
 205. Id. at 421. 
 206. Id. at 415–16. 
 207. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966)). 
 208. Id. (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850)). 
 209. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2004) (Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration). See also De 
La Rosa, supra note 49, at 83 (arguing Hatch-Waxman demonstrates that Congress recognizes the 
uniqueness of pharmaceutical patents and consequently that Congress should address the 
troubling consequences of inherency cases like Schering and SmithKline Beecham in order to 
allow pharmaceutical companies to maximize the value of their research and development). 
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anticipation so as to dispel confusion and properly bind the court.210
Presently, given that a three-judge Federal Circuit panel cannot 
overrule any other panel’s decision, earlier inherency decisions 
technically remain good law alongside the conflicting opinions in 
cases such as In re Montgomery.211 The need for clarification and 
establishment of a solid foundation en banc thus cannot be 
overstated.212 In announcing its definitive inherency decision en 
banc, the Federal Circuit need not adopt a “new” rule.213 Instead, the 
Federal Circuit should align the inherency test with the obviousness 
analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in KRS International Co.214
By taking an “expansive and flexible” approach to inherent 
anticipation, more complicated technology will not fall prey to 
bright-line rules, which might be appropriately applied to less 
 210. In addition to calling for en banc consideration of the issue, there is a possibility that the 
scope of inherency could be made clear through a grant of certiorari from the United States 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); 
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). In fact, Montgomery filed a petition for certiorari on 
August 6, 2012. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 
WL 3229399 (U.S. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 12-182). However, the Court denied the petition for 
certiorari on December 10, 2012, foreclosing any chance for additional review in In re 
Montgomery. 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 788 (2012). 
 211. Only en banc consideration of an issue permits the Federal Circuit to repudiate prior 
panel decisions. In the Federal Circuit’s first case, South Corp. v. United States, the court, sitting 
en banc, adopted all the prior precedent of the Court of Claims and the CCPA. 690 F.2d 1368, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). The court noted it had the right to overrule any prior CCPA 
precedents, as well as any panel decisions that were later deemed improper, through en banc 
consideration. Id. at 1370 n.2. 
 212. The Federal Circuit has recognized the importance of en banc hearings. A recent en banc 
decision cites Justice Scalia, who in a 1998 letter to the Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Courts of Appeals, wrote: “[T]he function of en banc hearings . . . is not only to 
eliminate intra-circuit conflicts, but also to correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly 
wrong . . . . The disproportionate segment of [the Supreme Court's] discretionary docket that is 
consistently devoted to reviewing [a regional court of appeals'] judgments, and to reversing them 
by lopsided margins, suggests that this error-reduction function is not being performed 
effectively. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 72 (1999) (letter dated Aug. 21, 1998)). 
 213. The Federal Circuit may well disagree with the proposal set forth herein, but that does 
not change the need for reconsideration en banc or the fact that their present case law is 
questionable in light of the patent policy inherency is meant to foster. Though this Note takes the 
position that some post-Schering cases have been decided contrary to the patent policy behind 
inherency, another critical issue is that of inadequate guidance, i.e., predictability. The Federal 
Circuit can still rectify the inconsistencies of prior panel decisions, and properly bind the minority 
of the circuit that continues to adhere to pre-Schering cases, by taking a case en banc and 
announcing a rule of law consistent with the holding in Schering.
 214. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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complex inventions. A “common sense” approach also has the added 
benefit of allowing for constant adaptation to the current state of 
science and the arts. Finally, by avoiding a bright-line requirement 
that inherency cannot ever be X, or that it must always involve Y, the 
court is better equipped to focus on the proper goal of inherency—
protecting that which is already in the public domain from being 
wrenched away from the public by a patent.215
Under the “common sense” approach to inherency, the court 
would still ask whether the undisclosed result is inevitably present, 
or inherent, in the prior art and whether the prior art enabled a 
PHOSITA to practice the later claimed invention.216 But in 
answering the question of inevitability, the court should be mindful 
of the purpose of § 102 and the system of patent protection 
generally.217 Approached from this angle, the need for recourse to 
common-sense concepts such as recognition would not be denied 
when necessary to determine the extent to which the prior art 
inherently discloses, and therefore anticipates, later patent claims. 
There is no language in § 102 requiring either inevitability or 
enablement.218 Rather, inevitability and enablement are judicial 
creations that seek to ensure that subject matter previously disclosed 
is not later removed from the public domain through a patent 
grant.219 Thus, the common-sense approach to inherency in no way 
upsets the intent of Congress; to the contrary, it advances it by 
promoting the policy underlying the Patent Act, instead of focusing 
exclusively on judicially created concepts not expressly set forth in 
the statute.220
If the common-sense approach were applied to the facts of 
Schering, the outcome would be the same. The compound DCL was 
placed within the public domain by Schering’s loratadine patent 
because it formed naturally upon human metabolization.221 DCL 
 215. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 216. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1379–80 (majority opinion) (discussing the 
facts necessary to establish anticipation through inherency). 
 217. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 218. Id.
 219. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 220. Compare id. (discussing purpose of inherency), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (discussing the 
novelty requirement and setting forth the statutory basis for anticipation). 
 221. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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exists as a necessary part of loratadine, and even more importantly, 
Schering’s prior art patent on loratadine disclosed the efficacy of 
administration of loratadine and administration to humans.222
Conversely, if the common sense test for inherency were applied 
in In re Montgomery, it would be clear that the majority erred in 
finding that HOPE anticipated Montgomery’s claims. HOPE did not 
inform the public that ramipril administration to stroke-prone 
patients decreased the risk of stroke.223 No cardiologist could have 
prescribed ramipril to treat stroke based on HOPE’s proposed tests of 
ramipril, nor would a PHOSITA have been placed on notice of the 
fact that ramipril treats or prevents stroke. For that, the HOPE 
authors asked the public to wait another four years.224 Meanwhile, 
when Montgomery filed his patent application, he disclosed that 
ramipril does, in fact, treat or prevent stroke,225 and he bestowed 
upon the public something heretofore unknown—something novel. It 
follows that Montgomery’s claims would not have been found 
invalid by inherency under the common-sense approach. 
The common-sense approach to inherency is, by definition, not a 
strict, bright-line rule that can be readily applied with minimal effort. 
Rather, the utility of this approach is its ability to take into account 
the multifaceted nature of the technology covered by U.S. patent law 
so as to ensure “uniformity and definiteness”226 without sacrificing 
the balance in patent policy concerning novelty, public disclosure, 
and inventorship. 
V. CONCLUSION
Predictability is among the most essential criterion of U.S. 
patent law. However, recent Federal Circuit decisions on inherent 
anticipation lack uniformity and predictability and, therefore, 
undermine the predictability of our patent system.227 The need to 
 222. Id.
 223. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id.
 225. As discussed supra, Montgomery’s patent specification disclosed effective treatment or 
prevention of stroke by administering ramipril to stroke-prone patients. See id. at 1377 (majority 
opinion).
 226. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere 
Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966)). 
 227. Compare Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(requiring recognition), and Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
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clarify the law of inherency en banc is thus of critical importance. 
While any clarification would help return patent law to some level of 
stability, the “common sense” approach proposed in this Note is 
specifically designed to maximize predictability while also 
promoting patent policy. 
As it stands, the Federal Circuit’s conception of inherency is so 
vast that applications of drugs for purposes that were never before 
envisioned are patent ineligible, simply because the drug was later 
discovered to effectively treat that ailment.228 The purpose of patent 
law is to promote the advancement of science and the useful arts,229
but the current law of inherency encourages only new growth, not 
improvements.230 Indeed, if claims like Montgomery’s, which build 
off of and improve previously patented subject matter, are invalid 
under the doctrine of inherency, the pharmaceutical industry is given 
little incentive to continue researching and developing the 
effectiveness of previously patented pharmaceuticals.231 When 
pharmaceuticals like ramipril can help prevent stroke-related death, 
but such characteristics were unknown at the time of patenting, it 
makes little sense to say that the person who discovered the 
previously unknown quality is less deserving of patent protection 
than the initial inventor, who knew nothing of the additional 
characteristics.232 Moreover, given the recent “bad drug” mass tort 
(demanding that the prior art produce the later claimed invention each and every time it is 
performed to find inherent anticipation), with Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting recognition), and In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (finding inherency 
despite evidence that the claimed method produced contradictory results). 
 228. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–83. 
 229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 230. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 231. For example, Montgomery was seeking to expand our knowledge of the efficacy of 
ramipril, yet, under the current doctrine of inherency, his patent was invalidated, providing him—
and the rest of the industry—no incentive to engage in similar conduct in the future. See In re 
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–83 (invalidating method of use patent involving administration of 
previously patented compound as inherently anticipated). 
 232. See id. at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting); see generally Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & 
Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 66 (1923) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880)) 
(“[I]f [the prior art] had [brought about the result sought by the patent applicant] under unusual 
conditions, accidental results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation.”). 
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cases, public policy clearly favors encouraging additional research 
and development on patented pharmaceuticals.233
The common-sense approach to inherency seeks to promote 
patent policy and protect both inventors and the public. At the same 
time, by requiring the court to focus on the purpose of § 102, instead 
of simply allowing discussion of the words long ago imposed to 
address that same purpose, the common-sense approach seeks to 
restore uniformity and predictability to the doctrine of inherency, and 
to patent law as a whole. 
 233. One such example is the Vioxx litigation. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Merck to Pay $950 
Million Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business 
/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-in-vioxx-case.html?_r=0. This is not to imply that Merck did 
not continue testing Vioxx, but in light of the fact that even drugs that receive FDA approval can 
turn out to be dangerous, public policy certainly favors laws encouraging additional research on 
previously patented drugs that are already being marketed for other purposes. Cf. In re
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–85 (invalidating method of use patent involving administration of 
previously patented compound to treat or prevent stroke as inherently anticipated, even where no 
prior art reference indicated the method of use effectively treated or prevented stroke). 
